The Iran-Contra affair concerned two secret covert operations during the Reagan Administration - operations that were coordinated by National Security Council (NSC) staff:

• The Contra operations in 1981-1986 involved the secret support of the U.S. government for Contra military and paramilitary groups in Nicaragua.
• The Iran operation in 1985-1986 involved efforts to obtain the release of Americans held hostage in the Middle East in exchange for the sale of U.S. weapons to Iran - and funneled through Israel - despite an U.S. Congressional embargo on such sales.

The Iran and Contra operations merged when funds generated from the sale of weapons to Iran were diverted to support the Contra effort in Nicaragua. 

Before getting into Iran-Contra, it is important to note that the idea of covert action in peacetime began during the administration of President Harry Truman. Until the mid-1970s, presidents set in motion hundreds of secret operations which were often carried out with few records, little discussion, and no debate. Covert action in peacetime, as defined in 1948 by a National Security Council directive includes "propaganda, economic warfare, preventive direct action, including sabotage, antisabotage, demolition and evacuation measures; subversion against hostile states, including assistance to underground resistance movements, guerrillas and refugee liberation groups, and support of indigenous anticommunist elements." The covert actions would be "so planned and executed that any U.S. government responsibility for them is not evident to unauthorized persons and if uncovered, the U.S. government can plausibly disclaim any responsibility for them."

In the mid-1970s, the federal government tightened its understanding of covert actions through two important reforms: formalized congressional oversight over covert actions and the creation of a paper trail for covert action - the "finding."The law that created the findings says, "No funds appropriated under the authority of this chapter or any other Act may be expended by or on behalf of the Central Intelligence Agency for operations in foreign countries, other than activities intended solely for obtaining necessary intelligence, unless and until the president finds that such operation is important to the national security of the United States."

And what are the most important things Americans should understand about Iran-Contra?

1. In December 1981, President Reagan signed an executive order authorizing a covert C.I.A. operation to support the Contras in Nicaragua - guerilla warriors who were trying to overthrow the rule of the Communist Sandinista government.
2. In 1982, Congress passed an amendment to the War Powers Act of 1973 stating that U.S. Agencies were prohibited from providing military equipment, training or support to anyone "for the purpose of overthrowing the Government of Nicaragua."
3. The Reagan Administration, however, narrowly interpreted the amendment to apply only to U.S. intelligence agencies, thus allowing the National Security Council to channel funds to the Contra rebels. The administration then got foreign countries to finance and further operations the Congress wouldn't fund, and it raised private charity contributions for foreign policies for which they could not receive national support.
   • This mainly involved outsourcing the job of funding the Contras to a small band of private sector covert operators and to foreign governments, which were privately requested or pressured by the Reaganites to support the secret contra support operation through buying weaponsf.
   • The "Iran" side of the scandal came from Reagan's covert efforts to sell weapons to Iran to obtain the release of American hostages held by terrorist groups supposedly under the control of Tehran - at a time when the White House was publicly declaring it would not negotiate with terrorists.
   • The two secret projects merged when cash generated from the weapons transactions with Iran was diverted to the Contra operation.
4. In short, a group of anti-communist, ultra conservatives in the the Reagan administration managed for two years to supply and direct a war in Central America despite congressional prohibitions, to arrange an swap of weapons for hostages with Iranian backers of terrorist groups and to come periously close to setting up a permanent secret team to carry out plots for the White House.
5. These covert operations were inherently dangerous to the checks and balances of American government since they evaded Congress' primary check on the executive branch - the power of the purse strings.
6. The Iran/contra vets were not to be trusted. Consequently, most of the officials involved in Iran-Contra went on to prosperous careers, with some even becoming part of the policymakers who advised George W. Bush to engage in the war in Iraq.
   • On Christmas Eve, 1992. George H.W. Bush, issued pardons for six of the major architects: Weinberger, Abrams, McFarlane, Clarridge, George and Fiers. Only Thomas Cline, a former CIA officer ended up going to jail due to the Iran/contra scandal.
   • Twenty years later during the Bush Administration, Abrams was deputy national security adviser for global democracy in the George W. Bush administration. A fellow who admitted that he had not told Congress the truth and who had aided a secret war mounted by a rebel force was supposed to promote democracy abroad.
     • Richard Cheney - the vice president - played a prominent part as a member of the joint congressional Iran-Contra inquiry of 1986, taking the position that Congress deserved major blame for interfering with Executive privilege.
     • David Addington - Cheney's chief of staff - was a congressional staffer during the joint select committee hearings in 1986 who worked closely with Cheney.
     • Robert M. Gates - President Bush's nominee to succeed Donald Rumsfeld - was accused of knowing more about Iran-Contra while it was underway than he admitted once the scandal broke. He was forced to give up his chance to head the CIA in early 1987 because of suspicions about his role but managed to attain the position when he was re-nominated in 1991.
     • Manuchehr Ghorbanifar - an important source in the Bush Administration for the Pentagon on current Iranian affairs - was the middleman who helped broker the arms deals involving the United States, Israel and Iran to bring about the release of American hostages being held in Lebanon
     • Edwin Meese - a member of the blue-ribbon Iraq Study Group created by the Bush Administration - was Reagan's attorney general who spearheaded an internal administration probe into the Iran-Contra connection in November 1986 that was widely criticized as a political exercise in protecting the president rather than a genuine inquiry by the nation's top law enforcement officer.
     • John Negroponte - appointed U.N. representative from 2001-2004,rambassador to Iraq in 2004 and director of national intelligence in 2005 - was the career diplomat who increased the U.S. military and intelligence presence in Central America as ambassador to Honduras, as well as participated in efforts to get the Honduran government to support the Contras after Congress banned direct U.S. aid to the rebels.
7. Those in the Reagan Administration learned a lesson - you can lie to Congress, spend federal dollars as you please, interfer in foreign nations, and get away with it! Even though the operations were eventually exposed, the Reagan administration and the first Bush administration did create enough pressure on Nicaragua and to force the expulsion of the Sandinista government in a 1990 election. Perhaps more important is that no one involved in the highest ranks of the presidential administrations was held accountable. Bush was elected president while Abrams and other scandal vets were rewarded with prominent posts in the next Republican administration of George W. Bush.

A Selected Chronology of Iran-Contra

1981 In December, President Reagan signed Executive Order 12333 authorizing a covert C.I.A. operation to support the Contras in Nicaragua - guerilla warriors who were trying to overthrow the rule of the Communist Sandinista government.

1982 The First Boland Amendment passed Congress on December 8th. This amendment to the War Powers Act of 1973, stated that U.S. Agencies are prohibited from providing military equipment, training or support to anyone "for the purpose of overthrowing the Government of Nicaragua." The Reagan Administration narrowly interpreted the amendment to apply only to U.S. intelligence agencies, thus allowing the National Security Council to channel funds to the Contra rebels.

1983 The Second Boland Amendment passed in December and limited the amount to be spent for military purposes in Nicaragua.

1984 On April 16, Reagan signed a directive for aggressive posture to terrorism. National Security Decision Directive 138 permitted both the CIA and the FBI to form covert operations teams and to use military special operations forces to conduct guerrilla-style war against guerrillas; permitted pre-emptive operations, retaliation, expanded intelligence collection, and when necessary, killing of guerrillas in "pre-emptive" self-defense; and permitted targeting states that sponsored terrorism, for military operation.

• On March 16, William Buckley, C.I.A. station chief in Beirut, was kidnapped and held hostage in the Middle East.
• On May 8, Rev. Benjamin Weir was kidnapped and held hostage in the Middle East.
• On May 9, in a televised speech, Reagan made his first public case for helping Contras in Nicaragua. "The Sandinista rule is a Communist reign of terror. Many of those who fought alongside the Sandinistas saw their revolution betrayed. They were denied power in the new government. Some were imprisoned, others exiled. Thousands who fought with the Sandinistas have taken up arms against them and are now called the Contras. They are freedom fighters."
• In July, after discussions with U.S. representatives, the Saudis began paying $1 million a month secretly to Contras. The money was deposited into a Cayman Islands account owned by Contra leader Adolfo Calero.
• On October 10, Congress passed the Third Boland Amendment which outlawed solicitation of 3rd-party countries to support Contras and prohibied the use of funds available to C.I.A., defense, or intelligence agencies for "supporting, directly or indirectly, military or paramilitary operations in Nicaragua by any nation, group, organization or individual."
• On December 3, another American, Peter Kilburn, was kidnapped and held hostage in the Middle East.

1985 On January 8, Reverand Lawrence M. Jenco was kidnapped in Beirut.

• On March 16, Terry A. Anderson of The Associated Press, was kidnapped. On May 28, David P. Jacobsen of the American University Hospital was kidnapped.
• On June 3, Mr. Buckley died in captivity and on June 9, Thomas M. Sutherland was kidnapped.
• On June 6, the Senate authorized nonmilitary aid to Contras. A 55-42 vote authorized $38 million over two years.
• On June 18, at a press conference dominated by the hostage crisis, Reagan vowed that the U.S. will never give in to terrorists' demands.
• On July 18, Reagan approved a secret plan for dialogue with Iran through the auspices of Iranian gunrunner Manucher Ghorbanifar. National Security Advisor McFarlane believes the US can win influence with Iranian moderates by helping Iran in its war with Iraq. Reagan believes the thaw in relations may help win the release of US hostages being held in Lebanon by Iranian-backed terrorists.
• On July 25, Israeli representatives met with Ghorbanifar for the first time on the arms deal. Israel agreed to sell arms to Iran and the U.S. agreed to replace Israeli stocks. Arms would be sold to Iran in exchange for hostage releases.
• On August 20, Israel sent 96 TOW (Tube-launched Optically-tracked Wire-to-command) missiles to Iran by Israel, but no hostages were released in return. Shipments continued through the end of the year.
• On Sept. 14, Israel sent 408 more TOW's to Iran and Mr. Weir was released that day.

1986 On February 25, Reagan asked Congress for $100 million in aid for Contras. The House rejected his appeal; the Senate approved his request. The bill was returned to the House.

• On May 29, Colonel Oliver North told McFarlane that profits of weapons sales to Iran were being diverted to the Contras.
• On June 25, the House passed the Contra aid package by 12 votes. Reagan called it "a step forward in bipartisan consensus in American foreign policy."
• On August 27, Reagan signed Omnibus Diplomatic Security and Antiterrorism Act that banned arms sales to nations that support terrorism and strengthened U.S. anti-terrorist measures.
• On October 5, Nicaraguan government soldiers shot down an American cargo plane that was carrying military supplies to Contra forces; the one surviving crew member, American Eugene Hasenfus, was taken into captivity and stated that he was employed by the CIA.
• In October, the United States Congress began an independent investigation into Iran-Contra.
• On November 3, the Lebanese magazine Al Shiraa reported that the U.S. had sold arms to Iran. The Iranian government confirmed the story. This marked the beginning of public knowledge of Iran-Contra.
• On November 13, in a nationally televised speech, Reagan admited sending some defensive weapons and spare parts to Iran, but denied it was part of an arms for hostages deal. "Our government has a firm policy not to capitulate to terrorist demands.... We did not -- repeat, did not -- trade weapons or anything else for hostages, nor will we." Polls showed that the American people did not believe Reagan.
• On November 22, Attorney General Meese's office discoverd the Iran-Contra connection. When searching North’s office, they found a memo dated 4/4/86 from North to Poindexter, which included an amount that to be sent to the Contras from the profits of the Iran sales. North, who had spent the night shredding papers, later called the diversion of funds, "a neat idea."
• On November 24, Meese told Reagan that some proceeds from the sale of arms to Iran went to the Contras. Reagan was visibly shaken and according to Meese, surprised. He was aware that the diversion of funds could mean impeachment for violation of the Boland Amendment.
• November 25: National Security Advisor John Poindexter resigned and Oliver North was fired. In a press conference, Meese announced that $10m to $30 million from sale of U.S. arms to Iran had been diverted to Swiss bank accounts for use by Contra rebels in Nicaragua.
• On November 25, President Reagan announced the creation of a Special Review Board to look into Iran-Contra; the following day, he appointed former Senator John Tower, former Secretary of State Edmund Muskie, and former National Security Adviser Brent Scowcroft to serve as members. This Presidential Commission took effect on December 1 and became known as the Tower Commission whose objectives were to inquire into "the circumstances surrounding the Iran-Contra matter, other case studies that might reveal strengths and weaknesses in the operation of the National Security Council system under stress, and the manner in which that system has served eight different Presidents since its inception in 1947." The commission was the first presidential commission to review and evaluate the National Security Council.
• On November 26, the criminal investigation of Iran-Contra began under the direction of the FBI - known as the Investigation of the Independent Counsel for Iran-Contra Matters. The investigation continued through 1988 and its final report was released in 1993.
• On December 2, Reagan appeared before the Tower Commission on to answer questions regarding his involvement in the affair. When asked about his role in the authorizing the arms deals, he stated that he had.

1987 On January 6, the Senate Select Committee on Secret Miliary Assistance to Iran and the Nicaraguan Opposition was formally established by Senate Resolution 23 and the House Select Committee to Investigate Covert Arms Transactions with Iran was established by House Resolution 12 on January 7. This is the third of three separate reports on Iran Contra.

• On February 2, Reagan testified for a second time to the Tower Commission His testimony was inconsistent and confused. The Commission pointed out Reagan hadn’t known about the August shipment of anti-tank missiles, but Reagan had said he DID know. When asked for an explanation, Reagan picked up a briefing memo he had been provided and read aloud: "If the question comes up at the Tower Board meeting, you might want to say that you were surprised."
• On February 20, a Reagan memo to the Tower Commission read: "I’m trying to recall events that happened eighteen months ago, I’m afraid that I let myself be influenced by others’ recollections, not my own.... The only honest answer is to state that try as I might, I cannot recall anything whatsoever about whether I approved an Israeli sale in advance or whether I approved replenishment of Israeli stocks around August of 1985. My answer therefore and the simple truth is, ‘I don’t remember, period.’"
• On February 26, Reagan received the Tower Commission report. The report could not link Reagan to diversion of funds from Iran to the Contras. But it concluded that Reagan, confused and unaware, allowed himself to be misled by dishonest staff members who organized the trade of arms to Iran for hostages held in Lebanon and pursued a secret war against the Nicaraguan government. The report charges that Reagan had failed to "insist upon accountability and performance review, " allowing the National Security Council process to collapse. Reagan’s approval rating went down to 42%.
• On March 4, Reagan acknowledged on national television that mistakes were made in regard to Iran-Contra. "A few months ago I told the American people I did not trade arms for hostages. My heart and my best intentions tell me that’s true, but the facts and evidence tell me it is not. As the Tower Board reported, what began as a strategic opening to Iran deteriorated, in its implementation, into trading arms for hostages. This runs counter to my own beliefs, to administration policy, and to the original strategy we had in mind. There are reasons why it happened, but no excuses. It was a mistake." Reagan’s approval rating rebounded to 51%.
• On August 3, Congress completed its public hearings on Iran-Contra and released it report on November 18th, stating "We may never know with precision or truth why it ever happened" and that the president bore "ultimate responsibility" for wrongdoing by his aides, and his administration exhibited "secrecy, deception and disdain for the law' ... The central remaining question is the role of the President in the Iran-contra affair. On this critical point, the shredding of documents by Poindexter, North and others, and the death of Casey, leave the record incomplete."

---

The Consequences of the Independent Counsel Report

Major findings of the Independent Counsel Lawrence E. Walsh's final Report:

• the sales of arms to Iran contravened United States Government policy and may have violated the Arms Export Control Act;
• the provision and coordination of support to the contras violated the Boland Amendment ban on aid to military activities in Nicaragua;
• the policies behind both the Iran and contra operations were fully reviewed and developed at the highest levels of the Reagan Administration;
• although there was little evidence of National Security Council level knowledge of most of the actual Contra-support operations, there was no evidence that any NSC member dissented from the underlying policy of keeping the Contras alive despite congressional limitations on Contra support;
• the Iran operations were carried out with the knowledge of, among others, President Ronald Reagan, Vice President George Bush, Secretary of State George P. Shultz, Secretary of Defense Caspar W. Weinberger, Director of Central Intelligence William J. Casey, and national security advisers Robert C. McFarlane and John M.Poindexter;
• of these officials, only Weinberger and Shultz dissented from the policy decision, and Weinberger eventually acquiesced by ordering the Department of Defense to provide the necessary arms;
• large volumes of highly relevant, contemporaneously created documents were systematically and willfully withheld from investigators by several Reagan Administration officials;
• following the revelation of these operations in October and November 1986, Reagan Administration officials deliberately deceived the Congress and the public about the level and extent of official knowledge of and support for these operations; and the President's most senior advisers and the Cabinet members on the National Security Council participated in the strategy to make National Security staff members McFarlane, Poindexter and North the scapegoats whose sacrifice would protect the Reagan Administration in its final two years. In an important sense, this strategy succeeded. Independent Counsel discovered much of the best evidence of the cover-up in the final year of active investigation, too late for most prosecutions.

Prosecutions that arose from the Report: Fourteen persons were charged with criminal violations. There were two broad classes of crimes charged:

• Operational crimes, which largely concerned the illegal use of funds generated in the course of the operations, and
• "cover-up" crimes, which largely concerned false statements and obstructions after the revelation of the operations.

All of the individuals charged were convicted, except for one CIA official whose case was dismissed on national security grounds and two officials who received unprecedented pre-trial pardons by President Bush following his electoral defeat in 1992. The individuals charged and the disposition of their cases were:

• Robert C. McFarlane (former National Security Advisor) pled guilty to four counts of withholding information from Congress; pardoned by President Bush.
• Oliver L. North (former Counter Terrrorism Advisor for the NSC) was convicted of altering and destroying documents, accepting an illegal gratuity, and aiding and abetting in the obstruction of Congress; conviction reversed on appeal.
• John M. Poindexter (former National Security Advisor) was convicted of conspiracy, false statements, destruction and removal of records, and obstruction of Congress; conviction reversed on appeal.
• Richard V. Secord (former Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs) pled guilty to making false statements to Congress.
• Albert Hakim (independent business man) pled guilty to supplementing the salary of North.
• Thomas G. Clines (independent business man) was convicted of four counts of tax-related offenses for failing to report income from the operations.
• Carl R. Channell (used a tax-exempt organization, the National Endowment for the Preservation of Liberty, to funnel millions of dollars in private contributions to the Contras) pleaded guilty to conspiracy to defraud the United States.
• Richard R. Miller (communications consultant who helped raise money for the Contras) pled guilty to conspiracy to defraud the United States.
• Clair E. George (former CIA Deputy Director of Operations) was convicted of false statements and perjury before Congress; pardoned by President Bush.
• Duane R. Clarridge (former CIA officers) was indicted on seven counts of perjury and false statements; pardoned before trial by President Bush;
• Alan D. Fiers, Jr. (former chief of CIA's Central American Task Force) pled guilty to withholding information from Congress; pardoned by President Bush.
• Joseph F. Fernandez (CIA officer) was indicted on four counts of obstruction and false statements; case dismissed when Attorney General Richard L. Thornburgh refused to declassify information needed for his defense.
• Elliott Abrams (consulting attorney to Reagan) pleaded guilty to withholding information from Congress; pardoned by President Bush.
• Caspar W. Weinberger (former Secretary of Defense) was charged with four counts of false statements and perjury; pardoned before trial by President Bush.

Of the 14, 6 were pardoned by President Bush and 2 had their convictions reversed upon appeal.  Thus, only 6 actually served their sentences.

In 2001, we heard more from three of those intimately involved in the Iran/Contra affair when George W. Bush nominated them for positions in his new government.

• John Negroponte (former U.S. Ambassador to Honduras) became US ambassador to the United Nation. Negoponte was US ambassador to Honduras during the years when the Nicaraguan Contra forces were based in southern Honduras, just across the border from Nicaragua.
• Otto Reich (former Assistant Administrator of the Agency for International Development) became assistant secretary of state for western hemisphere affairs. Reich had headed the Office of Public Diplomacy, a State Department agency which illegally funded pro-Contra propaganda both in the US and internationally.
• Elliott Abrams (former consulting attorney to Reagan) became director of the Office for Democracy, Human Rights and International Operations at the National Security Council - a White House position which is not subject to Senate confirmation. Abrams was convicted of lying to Congress about the Iran-Contra affair, but was later pardoned by Bush's father in 1992.