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HANDOUT ON QUEER THEORY: EVE KOSOFSKY SEDGWICK
Assignment for next time
Eve Kosofsky Sedgwick, "Introduction: Axiomatic," Epistemology of the Closet (Berkeley: U of California Press, 1990): 1-65. (on reserve)
Study tips and questions
1. In her second paragraph, Sedgwick insists on the "internal incoherence and mutual contradiction" of "commonsense views" (i.e., homophobic views) of human sexuality (1). Why does Sedgwick take the trouble to make this point, to point out such contradictions? Does she think that the contradictions work to weaken or strengthen the hegemony of homophobia?
As you go through the rest of Sedgwick's essay, look to see how she illustrates and illuminates the contradictions within homophobic (and indeed all hegemonic) discourses. It will help to keep in mind Freud's notion of "kettle logic," which he develops in The Interpretation of Dreams. As you may recall, Freud, in describing the contradictory logic of dreams, turns to a funny little story about a man, his neighbor, and the neighbor's kettle:
2. In her opening pages, Sedgwick speaks of "minoritizing" and "universalizing" approaches to the question of "hetero/homosexual definition." How do these approaches differ, and why does Sedgwick prefer the "universalizing" approach?
3. On pages 4-8, Sedgwick spends a lot of time talking about silence and ignorance--topics that obviously bear on the experience of being closeted. Her discussion of ignorance is especially provocative. Among other things, she says:
b. that ignorance is "as potent and multiple a thing as knowledge";
c. that ignorance "competes with knowledge" for control over "the flows of energy, desire, goods, meanings, persons";
d. that, in the course of a dialogue or discussion, it's actually the ignorant party who often gets to "define the terms of the exchange";
e. that it can be "dangerous" to imagine that you are involved in a political struggle against ignorance.
4. Like Judith Butler, Sedgwick draws on a distinction between "constantive" utterances and "performantive" ones. We've seen this distinction before; but it's well worth reviewing:
"Performative" utterances actually bring new conditions or states of affairs into existence: a good example of such an utterance might be, "I now pronounce you man and wife."
Now, as you'll recall, Butler uses this distinction to analyze statements like "I am a man" or "I am a lesbian," insisting that such statements, which might appear to be "constantives," are really "performatives" through and through.
Sedgwick is different. Her main interest lies not in identifying particular statements as constantive or performative. What she seeks to do, I feel, is to analyze the "performative effects" of a wide range of statements--some of which are homophobic and some of which are anti-homophobic. Why is she so concerned with these effects? And how is that concern related to her original point about the contradictions in homophobic, anti-gay ideologies?
5. Throughout this introduction, Sedgwick refers to the debate between "essentialist" and "constructivist" views of homosexual identity or "definition." How are these views related to the "nature versus nurture debate" discussed in her fourth axiom? Which side is the "nature" side, the "essentialist" or the "constructivist"? And vice versa?
Now, where does Dollimore stand in the "nature-versus-nurture debate"? What about Butler? And why, finally, does Sedgwick want to avoid the debate entirely? Is her position on this issue, which she states as her fourth axiom, at all unexpected? What did you make of her reasons for taking that position? Did you find her reasoning persuasive, frustrating--or both? (HINT: In thinking about this one, remember Joan Scott's claim that the "difference-versus-equlity" debate puts feminists in an "impossible position." Sedgwick is saying that the "nature-versus-nurture debate" does the same thing to gays, lesbians, and other gay-affirmative people. You're damned if you do, and damned if you don't--in hot water no matter what you say.)
6. What does Sedgwick have to say about the relationships among and between scholars mainly interested in gender and scholars mainly interested in sexuality? What does she say about relationships between lesbians and gay men? Why does she refuse to identify queer studies with womens' studies, and the identities of gay men with those of lesbians? Is she afraid of feminism, bored by lesbians? What's up with this?
7. In her sixth axiom, Sedgwick addresses the question of the canon. Were you surprised by her response to this question? How do you think her response has been informed and influenced by her reading of writers like Foucault and Derrida?
What next?